
Direct Testimony of Prof. Michael D. Whinston

U.S., et al. v. Google LLC

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

October 5, 2023



Assignment

- ➤ Determine whether general search services, general search text advertising, and search advertising in the United States are relevant antitrust markets for the purpose of evaluating Google's market power in this case
- Assess whether in recent years Google has possessed market power in those markets and, if so, assess the extent of Google's market power

Summary of opinions

- General search services, general search text advertising, and search advertising in the United States are relevant markets
- Google possesses substantial market power protected by barriers to entry in each of the relevant markets

Opinion 1

General search services, general search text advertising, and search advertising in the United States are relevant markets

Relevant Market

General Search Services

General Search Text Advertising Search Advertising

Trial testimony shows that general search services is a relevant market

- **Q.** And users, when they put something in the URL bar of Safari, they have an expectation that its going to go to a general search engine?
- A. Yes.

John Giannandrea, Senior VP of Machine Learning and Al Strategy



- **Q.** And who does DuckDuckGo consider to be its search engine competitors?
- A. Really most of our users switch from Google. So like far and away, we consider Google just our competitor. Other search engines that compete with us are Bing, Yahoo!, Ecosia, and Brave are probably the main ones in the U.S.
- **Q.** Does DuckDuckGo consider vertical search engines such as Amazon to be competitors that users are likely to switch to or from?
- A. No, not really.

Gabriel Weinberg, CEO & Founder



- **Q.** During your time in device marketing, has Verizon ever set a vertical search provider as the default search engine on a device?
- A. ... I am not aware of that happening.

Brian Higgins, Chief Customer Experience Officer



- **Q.** And thinking about the market today, who are Bing's search competitors?
- **A.** ... Candidly, when we talk about competition, it's one company, it's Google.

Jon Tinter, Corporate VP of Business Development



General search engines provide the ability to "one-stop shop"

- Single location for all queries
- Avoids the time and energy needed to recall or identify the right specialized site
- Provides results with depth and breadth unmatched by any single specialized site
- Caters to habit formation
- Convenient search bars on browsers and devices

"Google should be like a Swiss Army knife: clean, simple, the tool you want to take everywhere."

Marissa Mayer, Former Product
Manager



2002

General search engines provide the ability to "one-stop shop"



Hal Varian
Chief Economist




- Q. Google answers noncommercial queries because it hopes, at some point, the user will also type in a commercial query and Google can make money off of it?
- **A.** Something of that sort, yes.
- **Q.** Well, exactly, right?
- A. Yeah. Okay.

Other ways specialized search services differ from general search services


- Searches often must be done in pre-defined ways (drop-down menus, etc.)
- Results pages on specialized search engines are often very different from results pages on general search engines for the same query
- Many specialized search services limit results to info on site (not entire web)

The results pages of general search engines and specialized search engines have significant differences





amazon.com°



General search services differ significantly from social media

- Search function typically limited to the social media platform
- There are likely significant differences in the reliability of the information available on social media vs. general search engines
- Internal Google assessments of possible competition between Google and Facebook found no evidence that increased use of Facebook led to reduced use of Google

Internal Google documents

Android RSA terms

Chrome defaults

EU Choice Screen

 Internal Google documents: Google's internal documents focused on general search services rivals and market shares

Android RSA terms

Chrome defaults

EU Choice Screen

Google tracks market shares for general search engines

Penny Unit 15/3/2014 74/224 MM ... 15/3/224 MM ... 15/ Nicolaou Redacted@google.com]; Eisar Lipkovitz **Instant@google.com]; Ben Smith ***Instant Bedacted@google.com]; Scott Huffman Redacted@google.com]; Amit Singhai **Redacted@google.com]; Derek Wong Redacted@google.com]; Willia Hoffman-reverse google.comj.; Amis nigne
Lo "Beoogle.com]: Sundar Horisal Redaktel@google.com]: Hal Varian "Beoogle.com]: Lorraine Twohill
Lo "Beoogle.com]: Joan Bradd "Maria" google.com]: Tony Fagan "Iodatel@google.com]: Jane Penner
Redactel@google.com]: Joan Bradd "Maria" google.com]: Tony Fagan "Iodatel@google.com]: Jane Penner
Dandard dansels man | Laura | Lau Redacted@google.com]; Jake Hubert Redacted@google.com]; Rach Maheshwari Retains @google.com]; Heath Row Riley @google.com]; David Rolefson Redacted @google.com]; Elissa Lee Redacted @google.com]; Cristina Bita Redacted@google.com]; Karen Dubas Redacted@google.com]; Brian Bershad Redacted@google.com]; Biangleng Ai Redacted@google.com]; Tara Kousha Redacted@google.com]; Sergio Civetta Redacted@google.com]; Makoto Uchida Redacted@google.com]; Jeff Whipps Redacted@google.com]; Jim Koehler Redacted@google.com]; Michael

Finalized Dec and Q4 2013 US internal search share metrics

Below please find our finalized internal US search share metrics for Dec and O4 2013. All our internal datasources and Comscore show an increase for Bing in both Dec 2013 as well as in Q4 2013. We see a bit of a mixed bag for Google share. Our internal data-sources show Yahoo share being flat in Dec 2013, but continue to lose share in O4 2013 (vs Q3 2013). Comscore is even reporting that Yahoo is at an all-time low with 10.8% search share in Dec.

I am happy to report that as of Dec 2013, we are able to re-introduce Analytics as an internal data-source we can use for search share reporting. However, my team also recently discovered that Yahoo Search has gone HTTPS, which significantly impacts our ability to track Yahoo share across all three of our internal datasources (US online panel, Adsense and Analytics) going forward. My team is actively working to see what workarounds we have, but please note that search share reporting may be impacted in the short-term.

Adding Mobile tracking to our US online panel should begin in the next few weeks, and I hope we will have some preliminary #s to share with you by end of quarter.

Thanks very much to Remo Storni and Makoto Uchida for continuing to provide this data. Please let us know if you have any questions

DEC 2013 INTERNAL US SEARCH SHARE METRICS (pct pts delta from NOV 2013)

US Online Panel Search Session Share (home-only, desktops, incl Mac OS)* Bing 13.3% (+0.2 pct pt) Yahoo 6.7% (no change)

'Prior to 10K expansion sample size. Observed -0.4 pct pt for ACL and -0.1 pct pt for Ask

Adsense U.S. Click Share Bing 11.9% (+0.7 pct pt) Yahoo 7.1% (no change

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Ex. No. UPX0399 1:20-cv-03010-APM

GOOG-DOJ-19096965

DEC 2013 INTERNAL US SEARCH SHARE METRICS (pct pts delta from NOV 2013)

US Online Panel Search Session Share (home-only, desktops, incl Mac OS)*

Google 76.3% (+0.3 pct pt)

Bing 13.3% (+0.2 pct pt)

Yahoo 6.7% (no change)

*Prior to 10K expansion sample size. Observed -0.4 pct pt for AOL and -0.1 pct pt for Ask

Adsense U.S. Click Share

Google 78.6% (-0.5 pct pt)

Bing 11.9% (+0.7 pct pt)

Yahoo 7.1% (no change)

Analytics US. Click Share [NEW in Dec!]

Google 80.6%

Bing 10.6%

Yahoo 6.6%

(for comparison)

Comscore U.S. Explicit Search Share

Google 67.3% (+0.6 pct pt)

Bing 18.2% (+0.2 pct pt)

Yahoo 10.8% (-0.4 pct pt) [all-time low]

Q4 2013 INTERNAL US SEARCH SHARE METRICS (pct pts delta from Q3 2013)

US Online Panel Search Session Share (home-only, desktops, incl Mac OS)

Google 76.3% (-0.1 pct pt)

Bing 13.3% (+0.6 pct pt)

Yahoo 6.6% (-0.1 pct pt)

Adsense U.S. Click Share

Google 79.0% (+1.1 pct pt)


Bing 11.3% (+0.2 pct pt)


Yahoo 7.1% (-0.5 pct pt)

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

2014

Google collects competitive data on general search engines





1. Companies
Google
Bing
Duckduckgo
Qwant
Ecosia

2020

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

UPX0268, at -109, -182 (Aug. 2020).

- Internal Google documents
- Android RSA Terms: Android RSAs prevent preinstallation of "alternative search services" which has meant alternative general search engines
- Chrome defaults

EU Choice Screen

Internal Google documents

Android RSA terms

 Chrome defaults: Chrome Browser only lists general search engines in the settings option to change the search default

EU Choice Screen

Internal Google documents

Android RSA terms

Chrome defaults

 EU Choice Screen only lists general search engines and does so to "ensure a good user experience"

Only general search services are eligible for the EU choice screen

7/31/23, 8:54 PM

Android Choice Screen

The user will be required to choose one search provider from the choice screen during setup. The effect of a user selecting a search provider from the choice screen will be to (i) set the search provider (in a home screen search box to the selected provider, of (ii) est the default search provider (if chrome (if installed) to the selected provider, and (iii) install the search app of the selected provider (if not already installed). Note that in the case where a user takes an action to remove the Google search widget (including by restoring a previous device configuration where the widget had been removed), the widget will not be shown

The choice screen will begin appearing on devices distributed in the EEA starting in early 2020

Eligible search providers will need to fill out an application form and can bid for inclusion based on an auction. The auction process is explained in greater detail below.

The choice screen auction

Google will use a first-price sealed-bid auction to select the other general search providers that appear in the choice screen.

Google will conduct auctions on a per-country basis for the period from January 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020. Following the initial round of auctions, any subsequent rounds will occur once per year.

In each country auction, search providers will state the price that they are willing to pay each time a user selects them from the choice screen in the given country. Each country will have a minimum bid threshold. The three highest bidders that meet or exceed the bid threshold for a given country will appear in the choice screen for that country.

The auction winners, and Google, will be ordered randomly in the choice screen. In the event of a tie, Google will allocate the slots randomly among the tied bidders. In the event that fewer than three eligible search providers meet or exceed the bid threshold, Google will fill any remaining slots randomly from the pool of eligible search providers. The pool of eligible providers will include those that applied to participate in the choice screen but did not submit bids.

Eligibility criteria for participating in the choice screen

To ensure a good user experience, search providers that wish to participate in the choice screen must satisfy the following requirements.

- General search provider: The search provider must operate a "general search service." For purposes of the choice screen, a general search service is one that allows users to search for information across the entire Internet. Specialized or "vertical" search providers — those that only index content from a particular subject — are not eligible to participate in the choice screen. Search providers that are owned by or affiliated with the same company are eligible to appear on the choice screen only once. Search providers that syndicate search results from another provider are eligible to participate.
- Localization: Search providers must provide local language support in the countries where they apply to participate. Local
 language support in this context means that the user interface of both the search app (e.g., settings menu) and the search
 results page (e.g., navigation buttons) must be provided in one of the required local languages. For a list of languages that
 must be supported by country, click here. For best practices for localizing apps, visit:
 https://developer.android.com/quide/topics/resources/localization/.
- . App in Google Play. The search provider must have an app that is available for free in Google Play.

https://web.archive.org/web/20190802094608/https://www.android.com/choicescre

USDOJ-GOOG-00189505

5 2/5

"About the choice screen"




Eligibility criteria for participating in the choice screen

To ensure a good user experience, search providers that wish to participate in the choice screen must satisfy the following requirements.

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2022

Google's Chief Economist recognizes general search services as a relevant market



WRT the value of our product, specifically search, if Google were to disappear, people would just switch to Bing. If all search engines were to disappear we look like Borge's universal library, but with no card catalog.

Hal Varian, Chief Economist



2021

Relevant Market

General Search Services


General Search Text Advertising

Search Advertising


General search text ads are differentiated from other search ads


General Search Text Ads






Other Types of Search Ads






Product Listing Ads (PLAs)



REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING
Other Search Ads

Search ads are differentiated from other digital ads

Search Ads



Display/Social Ads













Factors affecting the substitutability of ad products

- Their role in consumers' purchase journeys
- The characteristics of their audiences and the degree to which they overlap
- The degree to which ads can be effectively targeted
- The form and level of their pricing
- The size of their audiences
- Advertisers' awareness of the products effectiveness and prices
- Advertisers' participation on their ad purchasing platforms

Relevant Market


General Search Services

General Search Text Advertising

Search Advertising

Search ads are differentiated from other digital ads

Search Ads



Display/Social Ads













Search ads are differentiated from display ads in important ways

- Display ads do not have an expressed signal of a consumer's intent at a given moment
- Display ads are typically used to build awareness or improve brand image rather than "conversion"
- Advertisers pay much higher prices for text ads than for display ads, consistent with their differentiation

Advertisers pay much higher prices for text ads than for display ads, consistent with their differentiation

Average Price Per Thousand Ad Impressions (CPM) for General Search Text Ads and Display Ads, 2020

Redacted

Display ads Search text ads

Google's Chief Economist recognizes that search ads are significantly differentiated from display ads

Why Remarketing Ads are Different Hal Varian October 2017

The two most popular ways of targeting display ads are contextual targeting (as in classical AFC) and remarketing. It turns out that they have rather different implications for ad spend.

Redacted

Note that the two decisions can be separated. The only way display spend impacts search spend is by affecting the marginal cost of acquiring an additional customer. (We will qualify this below.)

Contextual targeting

This is the simple case. You enter queries for cooking recipes into Google, you click on an organic page and you see ads for frying pans. You might click on one. We know that your conversion probability is smaller than if you had entered a query [frying pan] but we are comfortable with that. The advertiser can adjust its bid to reflect its own experience, or we can do it automatically using Smart Pricing.

We generally think that the revenue from the contextual display ads does not cannibalize search ad revenue. This isn't strictly true—think of marketing budgets—but it's probably a good working hypothesis. This is good because we only get to keep a ""% of the display ad revenue. If we thought there was significant cannibalization, as in Amir's "in market" targeting case, then we would worry.

Remarketing

With remarketing, we basically get two (or more) shots at the same purchase decision. If the user searches and the user clicks on an advertiser's ad, then the advertiser is getting v_s of value. If the user desent convert, then the same advertiser can target him again. How much is the retargeted user worth? I would argue it would be somewhere between v_s and v_d . The user is worth more than a random display ad clicker, but less than someone who just searched on a [frving plan] ad.

If the user clicks on the remarketing ad the advertiser is now pays twice to get the same consumer to visit its site.

Ex. No. UPX0414 1:20-cy-03010-APM

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GOOG-DOJ-03371697

We generally think that the revenue from the contextual display ads does not cannibalize search ad revenue.

Hal Varian, Chief Economist



2017

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UPX0414, at -697 (Oct. 2017).

Intent captured by retargeting ads is not as strong as intent captured by search ads



"And what matters much more than having a long and detailed history is having a solid indication of what the user is doing now, because recency is everything."

* * :

"So reminder ads are a form of intent. It's not as strong as the intent when you are searching something, but it says, well, you're probably interested in this product because you visited a website and examined that product."

Hal Varian, Chief Economist (5)



2020

Google explains to advertisers how search ads differ from display ads

Choose the right campaign type



Google Ads begins with a goal and a campaign.

You'll choose a campaign type based on your marketing goals, brand strategy, and how

This article helps you select the right campaign type for your advertising needs

Search campaigns: Text ads on search results

Search campaigns are text ads on search results that let you reach people while they're searching on Google for the products and services you offer.

It's great for driving sales, leads, or traffic to your website, as you can show your ads to people actively searching for your products and services

Why choose Search campaigns

- Sales and leads:
- · Boost your online sales and signups
- Consider using leads if you have a longer sales cycle

- Try Smart campaigns for an even easier setup.
- Highly specific targeting: Reach people actively searching for what you offer.

CREATE SEARCH CAMPAIGN

Display campaigns: Image ads on websites

Display campaigns let you reach a relevant audience with visually engaging ads as they browse millions of websites, apps, and Google-owned properties, such as YouTube, to achieve your marketing objectives. Display campaigns are a great way to expand your reach and stay top of mind with an audience beyond just Google Search.

You can also create a Display campaign that uses your data segments to show ads to people who've visited your website or have used your app.

Why choose Display campaigns

- · Sales and leads: Use visually engaging call-to-actions to drive sales and signups
- Awareness and consideration: Create memorable add to make people aware of your brand or consider your product.
- Reach: Target people beyond search results while they're browsing websites and apps
- Your data segments: Follow up with people who've already viewed your ads or visited your

Types of Display campaigns

Tip: It's helpful to use an image editing tool to create square and landscape versions of your display ad in the right dimensions and file size

Why choose Search campaigns

- · Sales and leads:
 - · Boost your online sales and signups.
 - Consider using leads if you have a longer sales cycle.
- · Easy setup:
 - · Write text ads and pick keywords.
 - Skip special files or assets—these aren't needed.
- Try Smart campaigns for an even easier setup.
- Highly specific targeting: Reach people actively searching for what you offer.

2022

Why choose Display campaigns

- Sales and leads: Use visually engaging call-to-actions to drive sales and signups.
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
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UPX8088, at -393 (Sept. 1, 2022)

Search ads are differentiated from social media ads in important ways

- Social media ads are targeted based largely on expressed or inferred interests rather than expressed intent at a given moment
- Social media ads are typically aimed at goals like awareness and branding
- Apple's recent privacy initiatives have further reduced the targeting capabilities of social media ads

Google launched discovery ads to compete with social media ads




2020


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
General Search Text Ads






Other Types of Search Ads





Product Listing Ads (PLAs)



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Other Search Ads

Google documents recognize the differences between PLAs and text ads

Differences wrt Search Ads


	Shopping	Search Ads
What does it look like?	screenshot	screenshot
Creatives	Relatively Structured (eg: every n-pack offer has image + price + merchant)	Unstructured (mostly free text)
Formats	Slate Level Primarily (eg: npack, showcase)	Ad Level Primarily (eg: click-to-call, site-links)
Ad Targeting	Keywordless (product groups)	Keywords
Multiple ads from same advertiser allowed	Yes	No
Pricing Algorithms	GSP, IGA (GGSP)	FIA++, MIA
New Ads Growth Direction	Horizontal (carousel)	Vertical (consumes VCAP)
LTV Score (Normalize by VCAP height)	No	Yes

2020

REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

UPX1084, at -477 (Jan. 2020).

Google has considered and rejected integrating PLA and text ad auctions



Lastly, user intent and advertiser value is different across the units, and as a result advertisers are not bidding on the same thing on Shopping and Text ads, so query-level CPC equalization could lead to problems with one unit being too expensive.

2017

A majority of Google's search ad revenue comes from advertisers who buy only text ads

2021 Share of Google Search Ad Revenue From Advertisers Who:

Redacted

Purchase Text Ads But Not PLAs Purchase both Text Ads and PLAs Purchase PLAs But Not Text Ads

Google recognizes the differences between PLAs and text ads

2017 Google Email Thread

Shopping [PLAs] and Text Ads are **different products** with different goals. . . .

Today these two formats
[PLAs and text ads] are siloed
in their own world and don't
compete, it will be worth
looking at pricing from that
point of view.

2023 Trial Testimony


Q. PLAs are a different species than text ads; is that right?

A. Yes.

Hal Varian, Chief Economist



Text ad prices are higher and have increased over time relative to PLA prices, consistent with their differentiation



Search ads on specialized search engines are differentiated from text ads

- For many ads on specialized search engines, the consumer is taken to another page on the platform
- Advertisers may view specialized search engines as rivals and therefore do not want to advertise on them
- Specialized search engines—some of the biggest advertisers—are not likely to advertise on their rivals


Relevant Market

General Search Services

General Search Text Advertising

Search Advertising

Google views search ads as distinct from other digital ads



2019

Opinion 2

Google possesses substantial market power protected by barriers to entry in each of the relevant markets

Monopoly Power

General Search Services

General Search Text Advertising Search Advertising


Economic evidence that Google has monopoly power in general search services

- Google's market shares
- High barriers to entry and expansion
- Google's significant advantages over its general search rivals
- Low consumer responsiveness to quality reductions
- The substantial profits Google earns from its distribution contracts


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
Google has close to 90% of the US general search services market



Google has had a dominant and increasing share since at least 2009



On mobile phones Google's share is even higher



Economic evidence that Google has monopoly power in general search services

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- High barriers to entry and expansion
- Google's significant advantages over its general search rivals
- Low consumer responsiveness to quality reductions
- The substantial profits Google earns from its distribution contracts

The general search services market has significant barriers to entry

- Large fixed and sunk capital costs
- Google's strong brand recognition and loyalty
- Scale

- Google's ownership of Chrome web browser
- Google's control of search access point defaults through its exclusionary contracts

Entering general search services is expensive

Annual costs to Google for search services:

Redacted

- Additional annual costs to Google for search advertising:

 Redacted
- In 2020, Bing earned only Redacted in search advertising revenue

The general search services market has significant barriers to entry

- Large fixed and sunk capital costs
- Google's strong brand recognition and loyalty
- Scale

- Google's ownership of Chrome web browser
- Google's control of search access point defaults through its exclusionary contracts

Economic evidence that Google has monopoly power in general search services

- Google's market shares
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Google has significant advantages over its general search rivals

- Search services quality advantages
 - Between 2015 and 2021, the difference in the US between Google's and Bing's IS scores ranged from Redacted
- Brand image and reputation advantages

Monetization advantages, especially in mobile

Google's RPM advantage over Microsoft is driven by its much higher RPM on mobile phones

Search Revenue Per 1,000 Queries (RPM), PCs and Mobile Phones

Google (PCs) Google (Mobile Phones) Bing (PCs) Bing (Mobile Phones)


Redacted

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 REDACTED FOR PUBLIC FILING

Economic evidence that Google has monopoly power in general search services

- Google's market shares
- High barriers to entry and expansion
- Google's significant advantages over its general search rivals
- Low consumer responsiveness to quality reductions
- The substantial profits Google earns from its distribution contracts

Google's experiments show low consumer responsiveness to quality



Redacted

go/is-ιο-growth Living doc, last updated in July, 2020



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* *

Results

Ablation experiments (2016) for large ranking components (eg. Navboost, Synonyms, etc.) show that Redacted (global effect, not enough data for per-country effect), ablation experiment in 2020-2021 showed roughly consistent result.

- Study was based on 2-3 month ablations; external analysis suggests the usage loss continues but at a declining rate for Redacted
 Redacted
- Suggest to convert Redacted increase, which translates to Redacted Search DAU, query, revenue lift under the assumption that queries/DAU and revenue/DAU stays constant. In other words, Redacted of Search revenue ex-TAC (Traffic Acquisition coord-page 2003).

Connect Search Quality Improvements to Growth

In other words,

Redacted

of Search revenue ex-TAC (Traffic Acquisition Cost).

2020

Economic evidence that Google has monopoly power in general search services

- Google's market shares
- High barriers to entry and expansion
- Google's significant advantages over its general search rivals
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- The substantial profits Google earns from its distribution contracts

Monopoly Power

General Search Services

General Search Text Advertising Search Advertising

Economic evidence that Google has monopoly power in the relevant ad markets


Google's high market shares

Barriers to entry


Google's significant advantages over its search ad rivals

 Low advertiser responsiveness allowed Google to raise its text ad prices significantly

Google's US market share in general search text ads was 88% in 2020



Google's US market share in search ads was 74% in 2020



Economic evidence that Google has monopoly power in the relevant ad markets

Google's high market shares

Barriers to entry

Google's significant advantages over its search ad rivals

 Low advertiser responsiveness allowed Google to raise its text ad prices significantly

Google's Search Ads Price Index, PCs and Mobile Phones (US)

PCs Mobile Phones


Redacted

2013 2014

2020


2021

Google has launched price increases of 5% on search ads and it resulted in an increase in revenue to Google



- Q. And when Google launched price increases of 5 percent on search ads, it resulted in an increase in revenue to Google; correct?
- **A.** Typically, it would result in an increase in revenue.

Google adjusted the rules of the auction to raise text ad prices




We need a way to extract value more directly . . . We need *pricing mechanisms* with *pricing knobs*

2018

Redacted

Omkar: That's what Redacted was for
 Gaurav will follow up with more detailed questions

Momiji Review 2 (6/8/2017)



- Agenda:
- Do we want to raise prices?
- How we would roll-out?
- How far we want to go
 - (1) Advertiser paying less than value. Hard to define.
 - (2) People in top 1 operating at a discount relative to other positions.
 Redacted are we in agreement that making the curves for two seems non controversial?
 - Redacted@: not completely safe to get the same curve because some bids can be bogus.
 - Redacted@:But two facts from that graph: it shows 2nd price is broken.
 Typically E.g. if you're bidding much higher than competition, if Nav singleton, if you're better at exploiting queries that weren't found by your competitor...
 - Redacted@: under full competition though that applies → yes

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Agenda:

- o Do we want to raise prices?
- Is it ok to raise prices?
- o How we would roll-out?

Redacted

2017

Google expected to make "billions" from Project Momiji

A) Momiji Opportunity

Likely billions in format pricing + squashing

- ~10% RPM from Format Pricing
- ~5% RPM from Squashing
- Work well together (i.e. ~15% total)
- More opportunity on Mobile than Desktop

2016