Jun 01, 2026
On June 1, The Capitol Forum held a conference call with Dr. Liza Lovdahl-Gormsen, Senior Research Fellow at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law and Class Representative in the UK Facebook collective action against Meta, to discuss Dr. Lovdahl-Gormsen’s multibillion-pound collective action claim against Meta, which alleges the company abused its dominant position in personal social media by imposing unfair terms and conditions on millions of UK Facebook users. The full transcript, which has been modified slightly for accuracy, can be found below.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: Great. I’m Javier Espinoza, Europe Executive Editor at The Capitol Forum. It is a great pleasure to welcome Dr. Liza Lovdahl-Gormsen to this latest conversation. Today we will focus our attention on a class action that Liza has launched. You give us all the details against the owner of Facebook, Meta. First of all, thank you for taking the time.
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: Thank you very much, Javier, for having me.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: And Liza, you and I have had many conversations over the years on different subjects, but one that I suppose makes you a mini-celebrity is this class action in the UK, among some people, at least. First of all, before we get into all the details, can we start talking about what is the legal theory of harm and what are the allegations on Meta and this excessive sort of use of data from consumers in the UK, which I understand is quite large, right? The constituency of people that are affected, that you say are affected.
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: Yeah, that’s absolutely right. 46 million UK users. So, quite a large group of people. So, thank you for that question.
Basically, my theory of harm is that Meta has abused its dominant position by exploiting UK users of Facebook and that infringes on the Article 102 of the European Treaty and also Chapter 2 of the Competition Act of 1998 in the UK, the equivalent provision to Article 102 TFEU. And I’m claiming that Meta has used its dominant position as a social media network platform to impose unfair terms, prices and trading conditions on users on a take it or leave it basis.
To elaborate a little bit about that, because people may think, oh, well, but I don’t really pay anything on a monthly basis to be on Facebook. So, how can I have been exploited? the exploitation is that Meta requires UK users—in order to gain access to its platform—it requires extensive personal data as a mandatory condition for joining the platform. And that requirement is, in my view, disproportionate and unnecessary to achieve the commercial objective of providing a social network service.
And we know very well that Meta or as it was called Facebook used to function very well without that excessive data collection. Meta is demanding an unfairly high price or payment in kind from users. I argue that there is no reasonable or proportionate relationship between the value of personal data extracted by Meta and the actual value of the social network service users receive in return.
It’s the kind of the opaque and incomprehensible methods by which Meta forces its terms and conditions upon users. And the way it then subsequently collects, uses and monetize that personal data, in my view, is unfair and anti-competitive. Meta is using this data to generate vast revenue by charting advertisers for highly targeted ads. UK users suffer loss of control over their personal data without receiving any adequate compensation or recompense in return.
I think just to finish on this question is I think it’s quite well established now that personal data is a valuable asset. Damages for unlawful use of personal data can be calculated on what a reasonable person would have paid for the right of use. So, yeah, back to you, Javier.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: That’s a good introduction. Thank you very much. Just to remind those who are also joining us, if you have any questions to do so via the chat or the Q&A panel on your screens. In terms of the case that you set up, the theory of harm, can you give us a bit of the timeline from the beginning, even from before you launched this class action? How did it start? When? Why? Talk us through the beginning.
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: I initially did some research just on platforms in general. And the more research I’ve done, the more I figured out that Facebook’s business model was quite abusive. So, I developed a theory of harm And I got an economic consultancy to help me run some choice modeling exercises to substantiate the theory of harm, to see whether what I was thinking actually reflected reality. We did some surveys. My thinking around the case started in 2019. And I had conversations with various competition authorities around the world about this at the time.
All of that happened before I went to get funding for the case and before I then engaged with a law firm and an economic consultancy who is now helping me. All of that thinking was happening back in 2018-19. So, that’s quite a number of years ago. And I published a very lengthy, 100-page, article entitled Facebook’s anticompetitive lean in strategies on Facebook’s exploitation, , which I also sent to Meta to engage in a conversation before I went ahead with this action. So, that was all going on before I even went to the Competition Appeal Tribunal in the UK.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: And what happened since you launched this class action? What’s been the timeline? These cases tend to be straightforward, but maybe not. Have there been any ups and downs in the duration so far?
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: Of course, Javier. There is always ups and downs in litigation. In February 2024, the Competition Appeal Tribunal officially certified the claim, which meant that the case was allowed to proceed as an opt-out collective action. And I’m sure people know the difference between opt-in and opt-out. But opt-in is basically where people actively have to become a member of the class and opt-out is where users are automatically part of a class.
Meta appealed the certification and that was refused in April 2024. In September 2025, I applied to the Tribunal to amend my claim to include user damages. The Tribunal allowed me to amend my application. Meta’s application to appeal the decision was subsequently refused by the Competition Appeal Tribunal, but Court of Appeal granted them leave to appeal. We are waiting for that hearing to go ahead in July of this year.
But towards the end of last year and in the beginning of this year, we have had quite a number of case management conferences to resolve matters such as data extraction timelines, requests for further information, and defining the scope of the electronic data searches. So, all of that is going on in the background. And we recently in April had another case management conference where we specifically considered directions and timeline for exchange of formal and factual expert evidence. And now we are in the period of disclosure with a long stop date in February 2027. And we then proceed to full trial in the autumn of 2028.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: So, a lot has happened and a lot keeps happening. So, my question was on this timeline and just on the update on the current status of the litigation. And this is, I guess, a complaint that people have in all these cases. Isn’t the business model changing so radically now that by the time you get to a conclusion, the landscape that you saw at the beginning would be very different?
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: I hear what you’re saying, Javier. I don’t think that Meta has changed their business model drastically. I mean, this is a two-sided platform. We have advertisers on one side and we have users on the other side. This is an advertised run business model. This is a very old form of a business model that has existed for hundreds and hundreds of years before Meta even was born back over 20 years ago.
But I haven’t seen a change in that business model. And I don’t think there is any problem with the advertising business model in and of itself. It is the fact that the quid pro-quo, in a way, the fact is the data extraction that’s happening—and because they’re dominant in the market for social media and stuff like that, it’s because it becomes an antitrust case in that way.
But I don’t think that the business model as such has changed. The reason why Meta can give advertisers so specific data is, of course, because they extracted from users. And it’s not just first-party data. It’s also third-party data, meaning all the data they get from third-party websites. So, yes, I can’t see that things have changed despite how rapidly things are moving on in technology.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: Interesting. And you talk about the business model and some people say that personal data is the new gold. Let’s talk about the potential implications for Meta then on this case. And, of course, I guess we have a binary choice, right? It can go in their favor or against them.
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: Yeah. Well, you can also end somewhere in the middle where the Tribunal side a little bit with you and side a little bit with Meta. So, it could also maybe land somewhere in middle. But, of course, if I’m successful in my claim, it would basically mean that they would have to end this take it or leave it data bundling.
Meta would no longer be allowed to kind of lock access to free social network behind an all or nothing data tracking wall. And I can imagine that similar ecosystems, like Google and ByteDance, for example, would be forced to kind of unbundle and provide some granular choice architecture such as you might see a shift to pay or consent or pay tiers. So, to compensate for restricted tracking and platforms would maybe likely pivot towards explicit monetization models, I would imagine.
And this could also accelerate the implementation of paid ad free subscription tiers and models where users are financially compensated or given platform credit in exchange for their data. But let’s assume that a—we’re thinking ahead of ourselves here—but let’s assume that a massive percentage of users choose to opt out of the off platform data collection that’s currently happening. That means the tracking of activity across thirdparty websites. The data profile used to sell to hybrid targeted ads would degrade significantly, I would imagine.
And that obviously would have an impact on advertisers would face higher acquisition costs due to less accurate targeting and potentially lead to redistribution of ad spend away from major social media ecosystem to what’s more contextualized, the advertising or kind of first party retail media network. But obviously, I’m thinking ahead of myself. But the case is all about them not expanding their data harvesting without kind of the corresponding increase in service value to users.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: That would mean that the way that social media has been making money traditionally would totally—this is the implication. So, we talk about Meta, but you alluded to Google and others. It would totally transform their source of revenue.
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: Well, I think a lot of newspapers had to face a reality where ad revenue has gone from them over to social media, right? So, they had to deal with the entry of companies like Meta that has taken ad revenue away from them. So, if ad revenue, in my view, is being spread out a bit more, I don’t have a problem with that.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: Interesting. Very good. So, obviously your class action is one that lands in a sea of class actions at the moment against Big Tech players, but not only. What’s going on?
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: Well, I think multiple things are going on. First of all, I think we need to go back to 2015, where in the UK, we’ve got the Consumer Rights Act. And that basically was an act that paved the way for opt out claims where you can basically bundle a group of consumers with similar claims together. Before the enactment of the Consumer Rights Act, you could only opt in. And it’s, of course, more difficult to get people to opt in rather than opt out. So, that was the Consumer Rights Act of 2015 that paved the way for that.
So, that was what really kickstarted the whole thing in the UK. And then for several years after that reform, the regime remained relatively quiet, because I think they had hoped that more decisions would come from the CMA, which could be used to start follow-on proceedings. Basically, if the CMA had found liability you could then take that administrative decision and launch a followon claim before the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Where the CMA has established liability, you would need to prove causation between the anti-competitive behavior and harm to consumers and ask the Tribunal for compensation.
But that didn’t really happen. There were not a lot of decisions from the CMA, because the CMA is a competition authority with very limited resources. So, it’s not like they’re pumping out 20, 30 decisions every year that you can use to follow on from.
So, therefore, there wasn’t much to followon from, which is probably why the standalone regime started to grow. AT the same time, the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in Merricks versus MasterCard where it basically said that when you go to the Competition Appeal Tribunal, and you ask for a collective proceeding order, this is not some kind of mini trial where the Competition Appeal Tribunal has to turn every stone like you would do in a full trial. A proceeding order is something different. This meant that the bar for getting a collective proceeding order was not terribly high. Of course, I think the landscape is slightly changing as we speak, but at the time the bar was not very high. And then you also saw that third-party litigation funders were willing to invest in these claims. And it’s quite clear that many of these claims wouldn’t get off the ground if it wasn’t for third-party litigation funders who are willing to fund these claims for a return.
So, I think there are a number of factors that made my case, as you say, land in the sea of other claims. It was just the whole regime kind of took off in a way. But I did think that with the 2015 reform, that they hadn’t anticipated that the majority of cases were going to be standalone cases under Article 102 TFEU, or the equivalent Chapter 2 of the Competition Act of 1998. I don’t think they foresaw that. They probably thought that the CMA would have issued more decisions and there would have been more follow-on claims than standalone claims. But that didn’t materialize.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: Some have said that the CMA should be doing more, and maybe there’s this broader push on the current Labour government, the Activision deal. Is this really then the driver? So, people see not many decisions coming out of the CMA. Therefore, they’re moving to private litigation is essentially what’s going on?
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: Well, I obviously can’t speak on behalf of anybody else who’s running these claims. But it was clear to me that what happened in my case was that the CMA had done a market study in digital advertising, where they had basically concluded that Facebook and Google held a strong duopoly in digital advertising. This was a large piece of work with all the annexes of that market study, it was a 1700 page report. But the CMA never made a market investigation reference following its market study. Nothing ever kind of happened.
At the time – July 2020 – I challenged them on that, but they claimed digital regulation was just around the corner, so it could be dealt with by digital regulation rather than a market investigation. As we all know, the DMCC Act did not come into force before January 2025, so for almost five years nothing was done to alleviate the harm identified in its 2020 market study.
–This was my impetus for starting my case. And creating the legal theory of harm was very much based on the fact that I couldn’t believe, after that market study, that they didn’t do anything.
I can’t speak on behalf of everybody else, but that was definitely a reason that I looked into this, was simply because I could not believe that after all of that good work, nothing came out of that.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: This is definitely, at least in your case and in the others that I speak to, filling a void. Just to remind our audience—and thank you for taking the time to join us this afternoon—you can send your questions on the chat.
And in fact, speaking of that, we do have a question from someone. You mentioned thirdparty litigation funders. They asked, do you think the PACCAR decision—and I am multitasking, Liza, as we speak. The PACCAR decision for our audience, if they’re not aware of it, was where the UK Supreme Court ruling determined that a third-party litigation funding agreement, where a funder’s fees calculated a percentage of damages, constitute damages based agreements. Consequently, the consequence for that ruling was that many standard funding agreements were rendered unenforceable in English court.
So, maybe can you unpack that a bit? I think it needs a lot of context explanation, because this goes at the heart of the business model of some of these third-party litigations. So, the question is, do you think the PACCAR decision has been damaging for class actions like yours?
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: Well, in short—as you know, there is never a yes and a no answer to these things. I think that the PACCAR decision has had a huge reverberation across the thirdparty litigation funding community without a doubt.
The Supreme Court handed that judgment down in July 2023. I think that, in a way, I was prepared for that to go either way. So, I knew I had to change my litigation funding agreement depending on whether the Supreme Court was going to do A, or whether the Supreme Court was going to do B, or whether the Supreme Court was going to do C.
Again, I can’t talk on behalf of everybody else that are running class actions and whether they did the same. But we were kind of well prepared. But yes, I do think it has had a dampening impact.
What happened was that Supreme Court judgment was handed down when we had the previous Tory government. And it was clear that they wanted to reverse that judgment with legislation. But it didn’t make it to the “washup list” before the government changed. That meant that the conservative government did not manage to change that. And I don’t know how far we are in the current government now as to reversing the PACCAR decision.
But I think that it’s not just the PACCAR decision that has had an impact on third-party litigation funding. It’s also the fact that it’s also extremely expensive to litigate in the UK. Extremely expensive.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: How expensive?
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: Very. I mean, we’re talking billions, right. So, the UK is a very, very expensive jurisdiction to litigate in. And therefore, I’m sure the third-party litigation funders are thinking across Europe, across the world, they are thinking, hmm, if we compare the UK regime to regimes outside, then it is very expensive.
So, I think it’s a lot of things together. It is the PACCAR decision that has had a dampening effect. It’s the fact that it’s so extremely expensive. I think lack of legal certainty, there was a lot of uncertainty with the Tribunal. We’re still in what I call a phase of teething problems. So, although the Consumer Act came into force in 2015, and we’re now in 2026. There have been very few liability decisions and very few settlements.
Sowe are not much wiser. And the Tribunal, every time a case comes before the Tribunal, they come up with something new. They keep adding to the pile, which makes litigation more and more expensive. But it’s also to say that there is a lot of uncertainty as to what direction the Tribunal is going. So, you’re faced with a situation where you have the Supreme Court handing down PACCAR. You have a jurisdiction that’s very expensive. And then you have legal uncertainty from the Tribunal. It’s not a great environment.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: Have we any numbers—and I know that this regime is relatively new, your case is also relatively new. But do we have any success rate? Or have we had any big wins? I know that we had the PACCAR decision, but do we have the counter effect?
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: We have had, I mean, Kent versus Apple was a liability decision. So, that’s a success for the regime. And then we also have had a settlement in Walter Merricks’ case, the Merricks versus Mastercard. Some people can agree and disagree as to whether that settlement was successful, but I mean, he extracted a settlement. So, we have that, but it’s slow. The regime is slow. But hopefully, I think what will happen is the cumulative effect which will mean that suddenly, in a couple of years, we have quite a lot of decisions coming out in very quick succession.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: So, you wait for one and then you get many at the same time, like bosses.
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: Yeah, I think just because there’s so many cases in the pipeline, obviously, they need to be decided at some point. But, of course, you have appeals. Appeals take a long time. So, every time there is a little thing happening, the opposition might—the defense might appeal. So, that also takes time. So, all in all, I would imagine that in a couple of years, we’ll see quite a number of cases because we’ve had a number of hearings.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: Interesting. It’s a long game, it sounds, but there will be some action in the future. In fact, Liza, as we’re speaking, we have another question from the audience. So, thank you so much for your interaction. How have you outlined effect on competition in your case as a result of Meta’s dominance in social media and its abusive action, is the question. Is it effect on competition for social media platforms or on digital advertising or something else is the question?
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: Well, my focus is in the downstream market -the end users. rather than the upstream market. So, the advertiser side of the market. But given it’s a twosided platform you can’t look at one side without looking at the other as well.
But my main focus is in the downstream market of end users. So, I’m looking at the harm to them. So, the minute you start talking about effects, of course, in Article 102 TFEU and Chapter 2 of the Competition Act 1998, you very much have this thing where you look at exploitative versus exclusionary effects, whereas the exclusionary effects very much look at the effects on competition, whether exploitation, more look on the harm to consumer welfare to the users. So, my case is very much focused on exploitation and the users, but it’s difficult to isolate that totally from exclusionary abuse. But my focus is on exploitation.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: Excellent. Thank you so much. And we keep having questions from people Monday afternoon. And this audience is so engaged. So, this is great. Next question. What do you say to those, like in the Chamber of Commerce, that say that class action regime is costing the UK economy billions?
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: I would probably like to see a bit of evidence, some empirical evidence, for that claim. Because I do think that the American Chamber of Commerce is, if you look at their membership base, which is amongst others Big Tech, I probably think that they will look after their members, which is probably why they would say things like that. And I have yet to see any evidence substantiating that claim.
There is, of course, a consultation going on in the UK at the moment. So, the UK government is looking into this regime. I think it’s a pretty premature consultation to have. Not so much if you look at the years this regime has been in force 11 years, but it’s about what has the outcomes been. And we have too few outcomes, in my view, to actually look at whether this regime is working or not. So, in relation to that claim, I probably would want to see some evidence substantiating that claim that it’s costing society a lot of money.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: Interesting. It feels like we’re discovering a lot more about this world as your case goes through the process as well. And we have one more question. It says, your claim has sometimes been described as one that could equally be a data privacy or consumer claim. But there is, of course, no opt-out regime outside of competition claims. What are your thoughts on expansion of the regime, for example, a generic regime or the new Law Commission project on a potential consumer opt-out?
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: Well, I haven’t given much thought to that yet. But just to break down the question a little bit, what I would say to those people—and I’m not at all suggesting that the person who asked that question, that’s how the person is thinking. But if people think that I have massaged this kind of GDPR claim to become a competition claim or consumer claim to become a competition claim, because the opt-out regime is for competition claims.
I mean, here you have one of the most dominant companies in the world, right? And abuse of a dominant position exploiting users, right? So, that just falls neatly, perfectly, squarely within the abuse of dominance provision. I couldn’t think of a better case that goes squarely within that.
But to the second part of the question, or an element of the question, is also should that right, that opt-out right, you have in competition claims, should that be then expanded to other areas of law, like GDPR or consumer? I mean, again, I haven’t thought given this much thought. But one always have to think about, will such an expansion have any unintended consequences? Because initially, I think that’s a good thing to expand that. But on the other hand, I haven’t thought through what could be the potential unintended consequences of such a broadening of the regime. So, I would probably err on the side of coming back on that question.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: Interesting. Okay. Thank you for all the questions. I do have one lingering question, Liza, which is on exploitation and regulators. Because your case, it’s about that, your claim. How do you see the mindset of regulators, what they’re thinking? You’ve been tracking this for a long time.
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: It’s quite clear at the time when I started thinking about this claim and developing my theory of harm—I told you earlier on. That was in 2018. That was before we had the DMA. It was before we had the DMCC Act in the UK. It was before anybody had any sorts of regulation around the world.
So, at the time, I just could see very much that data is the pinnacle of the platform-driven economy we’re living in, right? And therefore, in the modern digital economy, dominant tech platforms rarely charge consumers with a fee. And therefore, the transaction very much relies on data for service, the barter model, I mean, the extraction of data in a way.
So, in a way, I was probably, like, ahead of my time in that way, that thinking about that in 2018, before we had regulation. But I think the more—because litigation is such a slow process, and because it has taken so long with this case, I feel that had I talked about this, had we had this very conversation, Javier, in 2018, people would probably not have been able to understand it as well as they do today. Where I think the majority of people now understand that data is a very valuable asset, and you shouldn’t part with it for free, and these sorts of things.
And then, of course, you had the regulation on the EU level coming into force. You had the regulation in the UK coming into force. And that basically just supported my view that something needed to be done in this area where data is—some call it the new oil. But I would rather say that it’s the pinnacle of the economy we’re living in at the minute.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: Very interesting. And as we can see, and we saw from the audience, a subject of growing interest. Liza, it’s been a pleasure to have a conversation with you today on this subject. I hope that we get you on the program again as your case progresses. But thank you also for the people who took the time to join our call today, and see you on the other side. Tell me.
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: One last thing, if people want to follow the case, I just want to tell them that I have a dedicated website, which is facebookclaim.co.uk. So, if people are interested in that, then they can go and look at the website, where there’s quite a lot of information.
JAVIER ESPINOZA: I was reading it myself, and it’s the place where you have everything in a very user-friendly way. So, really good. Thank you again for taking the time. And talk to you soon.
DR. LIZA LOVDAHL GORMSEN: Thank you so much.
